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Case No. 20050098-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The State's Reply Brief of Appellant responds to the contention, raised in 
defendant's brief, that State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, 52 P.3d 1194, altered the 
analysis applied under the Shondel doctrine. The State relies on its opening Brief of 
Appellant with regard to all other arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
FEDOROWICZ DID NOT ALTER THE RULE THAT SHONDEL 
APPLIES ONLY WHEN THE STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF THE 
TWO CRIMES AT ISSUE ARE IDENTICAL 
Defendant asserts that the trial court "properly applied Shondel when concluding 
that the methamphetamine residue found in the plastic baggie could support both the 
misdemeanor charge of possession of drug paraphernalia and the felony charge of 
[possession of] a controlled substance." Aple. Br. at 5. Defendant further contends that, 
based on that conclusion, the trial court properly ruled that defendant could only be 
charged with the misdemeanor crime under the facts of this case. Aple. Br. at 5-9. 
Defendant's contention fails. 
According to defendant, once the trial court established that the mens reas of both 
crimes here were identical, the trial court correctly defined the issue before it as '"not 
whether the residue [in the plastic baggie] is sufficient to support a charge of drug 
possession, but rather, whether residue alone is sufficient to support two separate charges 
and whether the existence of the residue would be an identical prohibition under the 
present circumstances.'" Aple. Br. at 7 (quoting R. 75). And, because any paraphernalia 
charge would have relied on the same evidence relied upon by the State to prosecute the 
drug possession charge, the trial court properly concluded that Shondel required 
prosecution only for the lesser crime. Aple. Br. at 8-9. 
However, the determinative question before the trial court under Shondel was not, 
as defendant suggests, whether the evidence relied upon by the State to prove the greater 
crime was the same evidence the State would have had to rely upon to prove the lesser 
crime had it been charged. See Aple. Br. at 5-9 (citing to actual evidence to be used by 
the State to contend that, in light of that evidence, "the same conduct is being 
proscribed"). 
Rather, the determinative question before the trial court under Shondel was 
whether the "statutes are wholly duplicative, [i.e.,] whether all the elements of the 
respective crimes are identical." Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f^ 51. As demonstrated in the 
State's opening brief, see Aplt. Br. at 6-9, the statute criminalizing possession of a 
controlled substance and the statute criminalizing possession of drug paraphernalia are 
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not "wholly duplicative" because "all the elements of the respective crimes" are not 
"identical/5 Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67,151. 
In making his argument, defendant appears to suggest that Fedorowicz altered the 
well-established rule that Shondel applies only when the statutes at issue contain 
precisely the same elements. See Aple. Br. at 6. Defendant acknowledges that 
Fedorowicz states that Shondel applies only when the statutes "are wholly duplicative,'" 
i.e., "'whether all the elements of the respective crimes are identical.'" Aple. Br. at 6 
(quoting Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, \ 51). He suggests, however, that the supreme court 
altered the Shondel doctrine when it then immediately stated: "Thus, we must first 
determine whether the mens rea, or intent, element is identical, and then we must 
determine whether the same conduct is proscribed.'" Aple. Br. at 6 (quoting Fedorowicz, 
2002UT67,TJ51). 
According to defendant, this latter statement by the supreme court indicates that 
the Shondel doctrine no longer requires "that the crimes . . . be identical" but, rather, 
requires "only that the mens rea and actus reus elements of the crimes . . . be identical." 
Aple. Br. at 6. In other words, according to defendant, that single statement in 
Fedorowicz converts the Shondel doctrine from one resting solely on the identical nature 
of the statutory elements of the crimes at issue to a much broader doctrine applying 
whenever the evidence used to establish one crime is the same evidence that would have 
to be used to prove a lesser crime. See Aple. Br. at 6-7 (comparing statutory elements for 
mens rea portion of test; comparing evidence State would use to prove the crimes for the 
actus reus portion of the test). 
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A proper reading of Fedorowicz does not support defendant's contention. First, 
the statement quoted by defendant does not3 itself, support defendant's contention that 
Fedorowicz transformed the Shondel doctrine from a statutory elements-based doctrine to 
an evidentiary-based one. See Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, ^  51. 
Second, in the same discussion in which defendant's statement appears, the 
supreme court notes that "Shondel does not preclude a prosecutor from choosing between 
two different crimes in charging an individual for particular conduct" but rather only 
"requires that a prosecutor who elects to charge an individual with a crime carrying a 
higher penalty or classification . . . be required to prove at least one additional or different 
element to obtain a conviction for the higher-penalty crime." Id. at f 48. These 
statements make sense only if the supreme court continues to view Shondel as a statutory 
elements-based doctrine. 
Third, the supreme court's application of Shondel in Fedorowicz is a straight-
forward comparison of the elements of the two crimes at issue. See Fedorowicz, 2002 
UT 67, fflj 52-58 (comparing mens rea elements and then "other elements") (emphasis 
and capitalization omitted). 
Finally, nowhere in the Fedorowicz opinion does the supreme court suggest an 
intent to revise the Shondel doctrine in any way. See Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, f^l[ 46-58. 
To the contrary, the court consistently cites prior Shondel case law to define the analysis 
it must apply. See id. ffl[ 46-49. 
In sum, nothing in Fedorowicz supports defendant's suggestion that Fedorowicz 
converted the Shondel doctrine from a statutory elements-based doctrine to an 
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evidentiary-based one. Thus, neither Fedorowicz nor prior case law applying the Shondel 
doctrine support defendant's contention that the trial court properly applied the doctrine 
in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, and for the reasons set forth in the State's opening 
brief, the State asks this Court to reverse the magistrate's order and order that defendant 
be bound over for the possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone with 
priors, a first degree felony, and absconding, a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 2 5 ^ January 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNI 
Assistant Attorney General 
Uxk. 
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